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I am therefore convinced that the prince who, in presence of an encroaching
democracy, should endeavor to impair the judicial authority in his dominions,
and to diminish the political influence of lawyers, would commit a great
mistake: he would let slip the substance of authority to grasp the shadow. He
would act more wisely in introducing lawyers into the government; and if he
entrusted despotism to them under the form of violence, perhaps he would
find it again in their hands under the external features of justice and law.
– Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Book I, Chapter 16
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Introduction: The Functions of Courts in
Authoritarian Politics
Tamir Moustafa and Tom Ginsburg
Two decades ago, Martin Shapiro urged public law scholars to expand their
horizons and begin studying “any public law other than constitutional law,
any court other than the Supreme Court, any public lawmaker other then the
judge, and any country other than the United States” (Shapiro 1989). Shapiro
recognized that American public law scholarship stood at the margins of polit-
ical science because it did not adequately engage the broad questions in the
field. Perhaps more importantly, Shapiro recognized that judicial institutions
had become important political players in a number of countries and that a
“judicialization of politics” was on the advance across much of the world.
Since Shapiro’s first call for more comparative scholarship, there has been
an explosion in the judicial politics literature focused on a variety of regions
and themes, including the role of courts in democratizing countries, the
relationship between law and social movements, and the judicialization of
international politics. However, there has been relatively little research on
the dynamics of judicial politics in non-democracies.1 This gap in the litera-
ture is likely the result of a long-standing presumption among many political
scientists that courts in authoritarian regimes serve as mere pawns of their
rulers, and that they therefore lack any independent influence in political life.
Note: This introduction includes material from The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law,
Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt by Tamir Moustafa (Cambridge University Press,
2007). For a more detailed elaboration of the theoretical framework undergirding this intro-
duction, see Chapter 2, “The Politics of Domination: Law and Resistance in Authoriatarian
States.”
1 This is somewhat puzzling given the longstanding view among some scholars that judicial
policymaking is antidemocratic (Dahl 1957, Hirschl 2004). The normative debate over judicial
governance in democratic theory indirectly suggests certain affinities between governance by
judiciary and nondemocratic regimes. After all, if courts constrain majorities, perhaps they
may be useful for regimes that have no interest at all in democracy.
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Yet, as many of the contributors to this volume have demonstrated elsewhere
(Barros 2002, Hilbink 2007, Moustafa 2007, Pereira 2005, Solomon 1996), the
empirical reality in many authoritarian regimes cuts against this conventional
wisdom.
Through a range of case studies and more general chapters, this volume
explores the conditions under which authoritarian rulers delegate decision-
making to judiciaries and the political consequences of that choice. The
approach is institutionalist in character in that it does not presume the reach
of law and courts, but views the scope of judicial authority and power as a
target for inquiry (Ginsburg and Kagan 2005). This introduction raises some
issues related to understanding courts in authoritarian politics, themes that are
elaborated in the chapters that follow.
why study courts in authoritarian regimes?
Our project should be viewed as a contribution to the burgeoning literature
on the judicialization of politics (Tate and Vallinder 1995; Shapiro and Stone
2002; Sieder, Schjolden, and Angell 2005). In many different countries, the
scope and impact of judicial authority are expanding, and judges are making
decisions that were previously reserved for majoritarian institutions. But while
the focus to date has been on democracies, we should not assume that judicial
institutions are irrelevant to political life in authoritarian polities.
Our inquiry is, alas, particularly timely. The 1990s notion of the Washington
Consensus, namely that democracy, markets, and the rule of law all would
develop in unison, looks hopelessly naı¨ve a decade later. At this writing, leftist
populism is on the rise in Latin America; Russia and most of the former Soviet
republics are best characterized as illiberal democracies, if not openly author-
itarian; “Market-Leninism” is alive and well in China and the rest of socialist
Asia; most of the Middle East remains unfree; and most African states alter-
nate between unconsolidated democracy and soft authoritarianism. Yet, as we
demonstrate in the chapters to come, many of these states exhibit an increas-
ingly prominent role for judicial institutions. Courts are often used to advance
the interests of authoritarian regimes, and yet paradoxically, they are also some-
times transformed into important sites of political resistance. In a surprising
number of cases, courts become the focal point of state-society contention,
resulting in a “judicialization of authoritarian politics” (Moustafa 2003, 2007).
Simply put, courts should be studied in authoritarian states because they
matter to political life. With more than half of all states categorized as
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian and more headed in that direction, it is
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crucial for us to get a grip on the reality of judicial politics in nondemocratic
environments.2
A second reason for taking courts in authoritarian regimes seriously is that
they provide a useful lens through which to examine a variety of political
dynamics in an environment that is otherwise distinguished by a lack of trans-
parency. The public nature of judicial process and the paper trail that courts
provide opens a point of access into internal regime dynamics and state-society
contention, even if the legal process requires some interpretation. For exam-
ple, in his study in this volume (see Chapter 8), Pierre Landry uses surveys of
court use to illustrate general patterns of norm diffusion in post-Mao China.
The Chinese regime has made the rule of law a central component of its legit-
imation strategy (Peerenboom 2002) and was supportive of Landry’s research.
What we learn is that political resources like party membership matter with
regard to propensities to use government institutions, even in a formally neutral
setting such as courts.
A third reason to examine courts in authoritarian regimes is to learn more
about the expansion and contraction of judicial power generally. Robert Barros
(Chapter 6) argues that the weakness of judicial institutions in the face of rising
authoritarianism in 1970s Chile and Argentina illustrates the general problems
that courts face when exercising their functions in contexts in which rulers
centralize previously separated powers or remove matters from ordinary court
jurisdiction. In those military dictatorships, courts were scarcely able to serve
as the last bastion for upholding rights when the rest of the constitutional order
had been marginalized. Courts need specific institutional configurations and
social support to fulfill their missions. By looking at the extreme environment
of a dictatorship, then, we may better understand the limited ability of courts
to safeguard individual rights and the rules of the political game in democ-
racies facing extraordinary circumstances. Similarly, several of our chapters
address the question of whether we are witnessing a “convergence” between
authoritarian and democratic regimes in the post-9/11 world. Although our
contributors come down on different sides of this debate, the rich discussion
underlines the fact that courts in authoritarian regimes provide a useful testing
ground for hypotheses on the expansion and contraction of judicial power
generally.
2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2006. Twenty-four percent of all countries compromis-
ing 36 percent of the world’s population were categorized as “not free.” An additional 30 per-
cent of all countries comprising 18 percent of the world’s population were categorized as “partly
free.”
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the functions of courts in authoritarian regimes
What motivates state leaders to establish judicial institutions with varying
degrees of autonomy? Following Moustafa (2007) we identify five primary
functions of courts in authoritarian states.Courts are used to (1) establish social
control and sideline political opponents, (2) bolster a regime’s claim to “legal”
legitimacy, (3) strengthen administrative compliance within the state’s own
bureaucratic machinery and solve coordination problems among competing
factions within the regime, (4) facilitate trade and investment, and (5) imple-
ment controversial policies so as to allow political distance from core elements
of the regime.3 This section describes each function in turn.
Social Control
The most obvious role played by courts in authoritarian systems is that of
exercising social control (Shapiro 1981). The core criminal law function is
the central mechanism for this task, but there are a variety of parallel instru-
ments that can be used to accomplish these goals – for example, the ordinary
or secret police, paramilitary units, and other components of the security
apparatus. One dimension on which authoritarian regimes differ is which of
these organizations are relied upon to maintain order and to sideline political
opponents.4 Thus, a crucial variable is the scope of judicial involvement. The
common technique of establishing special security courts shows that author-
itarian regimes exercise control over scope by channeling different types of
cases to different arenas (Toharia 1975).
Even when courts are used for social control, they vary a good deal in the
extent to which they enjoy real autonomy. Stalinist show trials – though a tiny
part of the criminal caseload of Soviet judges – utilized courts for political
education and the statement of regime policies, employing the form of law
without any autonomy given to courts. But other regimes may be less willing or
able to dictate outcomes in individual cases. One might categorize the levels of
autonomy of courts involved in implementing regime policies, ranging from
pure instruments in which outcomes and punishment are foreordained to
situations of relative autonomy in which courts can find defendants innocent.
3 These are in addition to the routine and universal function of conflict resolution in low-level
disputes (Shapiro 1981).
4 Perlmutter’s (1981) typology of authoritarian regimes highlights this in its threefold structural
categorization: single authoritarian party, bureaucratic-military complex, and parallel and
auxiliary structures of domination, such as police and paramilitary. Perlmutter believes that all
authoritarian leaders rely on one or another of these mechanisms as the primary instrument of
control.
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The contribution here by Anthony Pereira (Chapter 1) highlights these
dimensions of scope and autonomy. Pereira examines three contemporane-
ous military dictatorships in Latin America, which varied widely in their will-
ingness to use the regular judiciary to sideline political opponents. Where
courts showed deference to the regime, political cases were routed through
the regular judiciary and repression was therefore routinized and somewhat
domesticated. Where judicial-military relations were poor, on the other hand,
violence was extralegal in character, with much more lethal and arbitrary
consequences. Brazil, and to a lesser extent, Chile, fit the first pattern; judi-
cial autonomy was reduced significantly, but courts were used extensively to
sideline regime opponents. In Argentina, on the other hand, courts retained
a greater degree of autonomy, but their scope of action was sharply reduced
and state violence took on an extrajudicial dimension. The degree of judicial-
ization matters for how power is exercised in authoritarian regimes, and for
the fate of regime opponents.
Courts are also used to maintain social control in a broader, more political
sense. Hootan Shambayati’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 11) illus-
trates how regimes with a mixture of elected and unelected bodies use judicial
institutions to check the popular will. Turkey and Iran, two countries that are
in one sense diametric opposites of one another (the first being a fiercely sec-
ular regime and the latter a self-proclaimed theocracy), share a core political
dynamic. In Turkey, the secular power elite used unelected judicial insti-
tutions to check the Islamist AK Party, which controls the Turkish Grand
National Assembly. In Iran, the religious power elite similarly used unelected
judicial institutions to effectively check majoritarian institutions that were
controlled by reform-oriented politicians. In both cases, courts served as the
linchpin of regime control over the popular will.
Legitimation
Legitimacy is important even for authoritarian regimes, if only to economize
on the use of force that is also a component of maintaining power. With-
out the possibility of legitimation at the ballot box, authoritarian rulers often
seek to justify their continued rule through the achievement of substantive
outcomes, such as income redistribution, land reform, economic growth or
political stability in post-conflict environments. But to various degrees, author-
itarian rulers may also attempt to make up for their questionable legitimacy
by preserving judicial institutions that give the image, if not the full effect,
of constraints on arbitrary rule. In Pakistan, for example, judges have reluc-
tantly, but repeatedly, legalized the right of military leaders to rule after coups
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(Mahmud 1993). Similarly, after seizing control and declaring martial law in
the Philippines in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos cracked down on political oppo-
nents and attacked civil society, but left the courts open. Marcos reassured the
public that “the judiciary shall continue to function in accordance with its
present organization and personnel” and that his new government would have
effective “checks and balances,” which would be enforced by the Supreme
Court in a new framework of “constitutional authoritarianism” (Del Carmen
1973: 1050). The veneer of legal legitimation is valuable to authoritarians, and
may in fact bolster their image among certain constituencies.
Sometimes the target of legitimation is external rather than internal. When
confronted with the threat of Western colonialism in the late nineteenth
century, Japan’s rulers engineered a program of forced modernization that
was phenomenally successful. Since the Western powers had forced unequal
treaties on Japan through a characterization of Japan’s legal system as bar-
baric, nationalist elites made law the very center of their reform efforts. But
in practice, with the political economy organized around state intervention
and late development to catch up with the West, law received much less
emphasis as a means of social ordering – instead it provided a kind of for-
mal legitimacy to demonstrate to other nation-states that Japan was a member
of the club of modernity. Similarly, authoritarian regimes in postwar Korea
and Taiwan, dependent like Marcos on the security relationship with the
United States, kept an appearance of formal constitutional legality. Courts
were relatively autonomous, but the scope of their activity was carefully circum-
scribed. This staged deference to liberal legality was essential in the Cold War
environment.
In many cases, authoritarian regimes switch to the rule of law as a legit-
imizing narrative only after the failure of their initial policy objectives or after
popular support for the regime has faded. Tamir Moustafa’s contribution here
(Chapter 5) highlights how Anwar Sadat used rule-of-law rhetoric in Egypt to
overcome a tremendous legitimacy deficit left by the failures of Nasserism. In
his study in this volume, Pierre Landry (Chapter 8) similarly illustrates how
the legal system in post-Mao China has been used to build regime legitimacy
for the central government. For such legitimizing functions to succeed, how-
ever, judicial institutions must enjoy some degree of real autonomy from the
executive, and they must, at least on occasion, strike against the expressed
will of the regime. As E. P. Thompson (1975) famously noted, “the essential
precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that
it shall display an independence from gross manipulation.” Otherwise, legal
institutions “will mask nothing, legitimize nothing.” However, the more a
regime relies on rule-of-law rhetoric, the greater the opportunity for litigants
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and judges to expose the shortcomings of the government. This creates a core
tension between empowerment and control of courts.
Controlling Administrative Agents and Maintaining Elite Cohesion
Another reason to empower courts is to discipline administrative agents of the
state. As elaborated in this volume by Tom Ginsburg (Chapter 2), all rulers
face the problem of controlling their inferiors, who have superior information
but little incentive to share it. These problems may be particularly severe in
authoritarian states. Although authoritarian bureaucracies may not have such
niceties as civil service protections to insulate them from direct political pres-
sure from above, accurate information on bureaucratic misdeeds is even more
difficult for authoritarian regimes to collect because the typical mechanisms
for discovery, such as a free press or interest groups that monitor government
behavior, are suppressed to varying degrees. Courts can provide a useful mech-
anism by which rulers gain information on the behavior of their bureaucratic
subordinates.
These dynamics are clearly at play in a number of the cases here. Ginsburg
describes how the Chinese Communist Party turned to administrative law as
ideology waned and conventional tools of hierarchical control became less
effective (see also Solomon 2004). Jennifer Widner (2001; Chapter 9) observes
the same dynamic in several East African countries both before and after the
region’s democratic transitions, illustrating the utility of administrative courts
for enhancing bureaucratic compliance in both democratic and authoritarian
regimes. According to Widner (2001: 363), “opportunities to develop judicial
independence arose as leaders grew concerned about corruption within the
ranks of the ruling parties or with arbitrariness and excess on the part of lower
officials whose actions they could not supervise directly. The ability of private
parties or prosecutors to bring complaints against wayward civil servants and
party members in independent courts helped reduce the need for senior politi-
cians to monitor and cajole.” Similarly, Beatriz Magaloni’s contribution here
(Chapter 7) describes how, during the seven-decade stretch of single-party
rule in Mexico, citizens were encouraged to use the judicial mechanism of
amparo to challenge arbitrary applications by individual bureaucrats without
threatening the underlying policy. Finally, Moustafa (Chapter 5) traces how
the administrative court system was vastly expanded by the Egyptian regime
beginning in the 1970s in order to restore discipline to a rapidly expand-
ing and increasingly unwieldy bureaucracy. In all of these cases the ruling
parties did not provide recourse to judicial institutions out of benevolence.
Rather, regimes structured these mechanisms to better institutionalize their
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rule and to strengthen discipline within their states’ burgeoning administrative
hierarchies.
A variant of this logic is found in situations in which judicial institutions
are used to formalize ad hoc power sharing arrangements among regime
elites. Maintaining cohesion within the ruling coalition is a formidable chal-
lenge, and elite-level cleavages require careful management to prevent any one
faction from dominating the others.5 As with control of administrative agents,
judicial mechanisms can be employed to mitigate fragmentation within the
ruling apparatus.
Pinochet’s Chile provides the most lucid example of how constitutions have
been used to formalize pacts among competing factions within authoritarian
regimes and how judicial institutions are sometimes used to balance the com-
peting interests among those factions. According to Barros (2002), the 1980
Chilean Constitution represented a compromise among the four branches
of the military, which were organized along distinct, corporatist lines with
strong, cohesive interests, whereas the 1981 Tribunal Constitucional provided
a mechanism that enabled military commanders to arbitrate their differences
in light of the 1980 document. This institution, perhaps in unanticipated ways,
therefore played a major role in maintaining cohesion among the military and
in consolidating the 1980 Constitution.
Credible Commitments in the Economic Sphere
The central dilemma of market-based economies is that any state strong
enough to ensure protection of property rights is also strong enough to intrude
on them (Weingast 1995). Governments must therefore ensure that their
promises not to interfere with capital are credible and that they will not
renege when politically convenient later on. Establishing autonomous insti-
tutions is a common strategy to ensure credible and enduring policies in the
economic sphere – in monetary policy, securities regulation, and other areas.
Autonomous courts are one variant of this strategy. As elaborated by Hilton
Root and Karen May in this volume (Chapter 12), by establishing a neutral
institution to monitor and punish violations of property rights, the state can
make credible its promise to keep its hands off. Autonomous courts allow
economic actors to challenge government action, raising the cost of political
5 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 19) observe that “there is no transition whose beginning is not
the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime
itself.” Similar arguments can be found in a number of other studies including Haggard and
Kaufman (1995), Huntington (1991), and Rustow (1970).
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interference with economic activity. Root and May emphasize that there is
no necessary connection between the empowerment of the courts and the
ultimate liberalization of the political system.
Different regimes may be differently situated with regard to the ability
of courts to provide credibility. Authoritarian judiciaries vary in their initial
endowment of quality, and utilizing courts to make commitments credible
may be easier in postcolonial Hong Kong than in, say, Cambodia or Viet-
nam. Ceteris paribus, there may be a greater incentive to utilize courts when
preexisting levels of judicial quality are already high.
At the same time, a global trend toward economic liberalization in recent
decades has encouraged and facilitated the establishment or reform of more
robust judicial institutions. Courts provide transparent, nominally neutral
forums to challenge government action, and hence are useful for foreign
investors and trade. The WTO regime explicitly requires states to provide judi-
cial or quasi-judicial institutions in trade-related arenas; a network of bilateral
investment treaties promises neutral dispute resolution to reassure investors;
and multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank expend vast resources to promote judicial reform in devel-
oping countries. In the age of global competition for capital, it is difficult to
find any government that is not engaged in some program of judicial reform
designed to make legal institutions more effective, efficient, and predictable.
While the challenges of globalization are formidable for many developing
countries, the option of opting out is increasingly one of economic suicide.
This suggests that there are secular pressures toward judicialization of eco-
nomic activity. However, this does not mean that all state leaders have the
equal ability, incentive, or desire to utilize courts in this fashion. Root and
May emphasize that there is no reason to think that authoritarian rulers
will always pursue broad-based growth – indeed, for many regimes, broad-
based growth would undermine the ruling coalition. Similarly, authoritarian
regimes in resource-rich states, such as Myanmar or Saudi Arabia, need not
develop broad-based legal mechanisms to shelter investment and growth, but
can instead rely on narrow bases of regime finance. For such regimes, the
potential costs of judicial autonomy may outweigh any benefits, and they will
seek to utilize other mechanisms to establish whatever levels of credibility are
needed.
The Delegation of Controversial Reforms to Judicial Institutions
Authoritarian rulers also find great advantage in channeling controversial polit-
ical questions into judicial forums. In democratic settings, Tate and others
10 Tamir Moustafa and Tom Ginsburg
describe this process as “delegation by majoritarian institutions” (Tate 1995:
32). Several studies observe that democratically elected leaders often delegate
decision-making authority to judicial institutions either when majoritarian
institutions have reached a deadlock, or simply to avoid divisive and politically
costly issues. As Graber notes (1993: 43), “the aim of legislative deference to
the judiciary is for the courts to make controversial policies that political elites
approve of but cannot publicly champion, and to do so in such a way that
these elites are not held accountable by the general public, or at least not
as accountable as they would be had they personally voted for that policy.”
Seen from this perspective, some of the most memorable Supreme Court rul-
ings are not necessarily markers of judicial strength vis-a`-vis other branches of
government; rather they might be regarded as strategic modes of delegation
by officeholders and strategic compliance by judges (with somewhat similar
policymaking preferences) who are better insulated from the political reper-
cussions of controversial rulings.
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is the continued postpone-
ment of urgently needed economic reforms in postpopulist, authoritarian
regimes. Authoritarian rulers in these contexts are sensitive to the risks of
retreating from prior state commitments to subsidized goods and services,
state-owned enterprises, commitments to full employment, and broad pledges
to labor rights generally. They rightly fear popular backlash or elite-level splits
if they renege on policies that previously formed the ideological basis of their
rule. However, if authoritarian leaders can steer sensitive political questions
such as these into “nonpolitical” judicial forums, they stand a better chance
of minimizing the political fallout. Moustafa (2007) examines how dozens of
Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) rulings enabled the regime
to overturn socialist-oriented policies without having to face direct opposition
from social groups that were threatened by economic liberalization. SCC rul-
ings enabled the executive leadership to claim that they were simply respecting
an autonomous rule-of-law system rather than implementing sensitive reforms
through more overt political channels.
Complementarities among the Functions
The above list is hardly exhaustive, but does capture several common cir-
cumstances that motivate authoritarian leaders to empower courts. It is worth
noting that these functions are not exclusive, but complementary. For exam-
ple, two of the great threats to security of investment are low-level corruption
and bureaucratic arbitrariness. An administrative law regime that reduces
agency costs in administration is also likely to enhance credible commitments
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to property rights. In turn, economic growth and administrative quality are
likely to enhance a regime’s claims to legitimacy. Pereira’s study here and
Chaskalon’s (2003) discussion of South Africa both suggest that even harsh
regimes may be relatively legitimated if the social control function is domes-
ticated through legal means. In short, the functions of courts are likely to be
mutually supportive.
time horizons and the double-edged sword
To this point, we have catalogued a number of reasons why regimes may wish
to rely on judicial forms of governance. Some of these functions are likely to
be particular to authoritarian regimes, whereas others represent more general
dilemmas of states. Yet not every authoritarian regime chooses to utilize courts
to perform these functions. Under what circumstances are regimes more likely
to resolve these dilemmas with courts?
A crucial issue is the time horizon of the regime. Entrenched regimes with
long time horizons are more likely to turn to courts for core governance func-
tions for several reasons. First, relatively secure regimes have the opportunity
to experiment with more sophisticated forms of institutional development.
In the economic sphere, for example, secure regimes are more likely to prior-
itize institutional reforms such as courts that maximize long-term economic
growth and tax revenues. In contrast, regimes with a precarious grip on power
are generally less concerned with the long-term payoff of institutional reform
and are more likely to engage in predatory behavior (Olson 1993).
The same logic holds for the administrative functions that courts perform.
The principal-agent problems associated with bureaucracies are likely to
become more severe over time and in step with the degree of bureaucratic
complexity of the state. Ginsburg’s contribution in this volume (Chapter 2) ties
the shift toward administrative law to a decline in ideology as a basis for regime
legitimation and control of agents. Once again, relatively mature regimes have
the luxury of experimenting with more sophisticated forms of institutional de-
velopment and administrative discipline.
Third, there is also reason to believe that the longer a regime survives,
the more it is likely to shift its legitimizing rhetoric away from the achieve-
ment of substantive concerns to rule-of-law rhetoric. For example, Nasser
(1954–1970) pinned his legitimacy to the revolutionary principles of national
independence, the redistribution of national wealth, economic development,
and Arab nationalism. However, when the state failed to deliver, Anwar Sadat
(1970–1981) explicitly pinned the regime’s legitimacy on “sayadat al-qanun”
(the rule of law) to distance himself from those failures. Ginsburg notes a
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similar transformation to rule-of-law rhetoric in China. Mao Zedong almost
completely undermined judicial institutions after founding the People’s
Republic of China in 1949, but rule-of-law rhetoric is being increasingly used
by the regime to distance itself from the spectacular excesses and failures of its
past, and to build a new legitimizing ideology.6
Note that the timing of judicialization outlined here contrasts with that
found in democratic environments. Hirschl (2004) argues that judicialization
results when “departing hegemons” seek to extend their substantive policies
after prospective electoral loss. Similarly, Ginsburg (2003) views the estab-
lishment of judicial review as a strategy of political insurance by parties that
foresee themselves out of power in the near future. In both accounts, ruling
parties that will soon be displaced by their opponents have an incentive to em-
power the judiciary, because they believe the regime and its institutions
will continue without them. In authoritarian environments, by contrast, en-
trenched regimes (i.e., authoritarian regimes with longer time horizons) are
more likely to empower the judiciary, precisely to extend the life of the regime
and guard against a loss of power.
While the electoral logic of judicialization in democracies clearly does not
apply in authoritarian settings, our findings are broadly consistent with the
Ginsburg-Hirschl argument in the following sense. The electoral story hinges
at bottom on the disaggregation of interests within a governing regime. The
presence of two competing groups with different views of policy facilitates
the empowerment of the judiciary in democracies. Similarly, many of the
dilemmas that prompt authoritarian regimes to empower courts are intensified
by disaggregation within the regime. For example, the need for courts to resolve
internal coordination problems, as identified by Barros (2002), arises from a
degree of fragmentation within the ruling coalition. The need for control
of administrative agents is exacerbated by state fragmentation, as Ginsburg’s
account of China here suggests. Thus, when we expand the focus from a
simple electoral model to a broader one of state fragmentation, authoritarian
and democratic regimes may not be as dissimilar as first appears in terms of
the timing of judicial empowerment.
The decision to accord autonomy to courts depends on the particular con-
figuration of challenges faced by authoritarian regimes, but in an astonishing
array of circumstances, limited autonomy makes sense. The strategy, however,
is hardly risk-free. Once established, judicial institutions sometimes open new
6 For Nasser, these included the failure to deliver economic development, defeat in the 1967
war, and the collapse of the United Arab Republic with Syria. For Mao Zedong, these included
the Great Leap Forward, which resulted in the largest famine in human history with 30 million
deaths, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and the failure to deliver economic growth.
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avenues for activists to challenge regime policy. This is perhaps an inevitable
outcome, because, as Moustafa has previously noted, the success of each
of these regime-supporting functions depends upon some measure of real
judicial autonomy (2007). For example, commitments to property rights are
not credible unless courts have independence and real powers of judicial
review. Administrative courts cannot effectively stamp out corruption unless
they are independent from the political and bureaucratic machinery that they
are charged with supervising and disciplining. The strategy of “delegation by
authoritarian institutions” will not divert blame for the abrogation of populist
policies unless the courts striking down populist legislation are seen to be
independent from the regime. And finally, regime legitimacy derived from a
respect for judicial institutions also rings empty unless courts are perceived
to be independent from the government and they rule against government
interests from time to time.
Not all regimes will empower courts to capitalize on these functions, but
those that do create a uniquely independent institution with public access in
the midst of an authoritarian state. This provides one venue for what O’Brien
and Li (2005) call “rightful resistance,” defined as “a form of popular con-
tention that operates near the boundary of authorized channels, employs the
rhetoric and commitments of the powerful to curb the exercise of power,
hinges on locating and exploiting divisions within the state, and relies on
mobilizing support from the wider public.” Even when activists do not win
particular cases, courts can facilitate rightful resistance by providing publicity
about government malfeasance, deterring future abuses and developing skill
sets for activist leaders. Together, courts and activists can form what Moustafa
(2007) calls “judicial support networks,” namely institutions and associations,
both domestic and transnational, that facilitate the expansion of judicial power
by actively initiating litigation and/or supporting the independence of judicial
institutions if they come under attack. In authoritarian contexts, the fate of
judicial power and legal channels of recourse for political activists is inter-
twined.
Halliday, Feeley, and Karpik (2007) similarly find that the nature of the rela-
tionship among the various elements of the “legal complex” is a key variable in
curbing excessive state power. The bench, bar associations, prosecutors, and
nongovernmental organizations can work together to bolster judicial auton-
omy even in the face of authoritarian political systems. In Taiwan, for example,
the alternative bar association became a key site of organizing resistance to the
KMT regime, and both Korea and Taiwan had lawyer-activists as presidents
in the early twenty-first century (Ginsburg, 2007). Legality in the authoritarian
period provided the seeds for a complete institutional transformation once
democratization began. Similar dynamics seemed to potentially be underway
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in Pakistan in mid 2007 when Chief Justice Muhammad Chaudhry relied on
the support of the bar association to resist an attempt by General Musharraf to
remove him from office. Ultimately, the bar and the courts were subjected to
attack when Musharraf suspended the constitution; still, the courts have pro-
vided some space for regime opponents, and may do so again once political
circumstances are less charged.
how regimes contain courts
Given the potential use of courts as a double-edged sword, a central chal-
lenge for authoritarian rulers is to capitalize on the regime-supporting roles
that courts perform while minimizing their utility to the political opposition.
Courts in authoritarian states face acute limitations, but the most serious
constraints are often more subtle than tightly controlled appointment pro-
cedures, short term limits, and the like. Direct attacks on judges, such as
the crude campaign of physical intimidation of the judiciary in Zimbabwe
documented here by Jennifer Widner in Chapter 9, are also rare. More typ-
ically, regimes can contain judicial activism without infringing on judicial
autonomy. Following Moustafa (2007), we outline four principal strategies: (1)
providing institutional incentives that promote judicial self-restraint, (2) engi-
neering fragmented judicial systems, (3) constraining the access to justice, and
(4) incapacitating judicial support networks.
Judicial Self-Restraint
The assumption that courts serve as handmaidens of rulers obscures the strate-
gic choices that judges make in authoritarian contexts, just as they do in
democratic contexts.7 Judges are acutely aware of their insecure position in
the political system and their attenuated weakness vis-a`-vis the executive, as
well as the personal and political implications of rulings that impinge on the
core interests of the regime.
Core interests vary from one regime to the next depending on substantive
policy orientations, but all regimes seek to safeguard the core legal mecha-
nisms that undergird their ability to sideline political opponents and maintain
power. Reform-oriented judges therefore occupy a precarious position in the
legal/political order. They are hamstrung by a desire to build oppositional
credibility among judicial support networks, on the one hand, and an inability
to challenge core regime interests for risk of retribution, on the other hand.
7 A classic account in the American context is Murphy (1962).
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Given this precarious position, reform-minded judges typically apply subtle
pressure for political reform only at the margins of political life.
Core regime interests are typically challenged only when it appears that
the regime is on its way out of power. In most cases, reform-oriented judges
bide their time in anticipation of the moment that the regime will weaken
to the extent that defection is no longer futile, but can have an impact on
the broader constellation of political forces (Helmke 2002, 2005). Strategic
defection in such a circumstance is also motivated by the desire of judicial
actors to distance themselves from the outgoing regime and put themselves in
good stead with incoming rulers. The more typical mode of court activism in
a secure authoritarian regime is to apply subtle pressure for political reform at
the margins and to resist impinging on the core interests of the regime.
The dynamics of “core compliance” with regime interests are noted in
dozens of authoritarian states. In the Egyptian case, the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court issued dozens of progressive rulings that attempted to expand
basic rights and rein in executive abuses of power, but it never ruled on
constitutional challenges to the emergency laws or civilian transfers to mil-
itary courts, which formed the bedrock of regime dominance. Similarly, in
the early days of the Marcos regime, the Philippine Supreme Court did not
attempt to resist the decree of martial law, the imposition of a new constitution,
or decrees placing new constraints on the jurisdiction of the courts. Rather,
the court yielded to Marcos’s seizure of power, and it continued to submit
to the regime’s core political interests for the next fourteen years of rule.
Philippine Justices Castro and Makalintal candidly acknowledged the politi-
cal realities that undoubtedly shaped the court’s unwillingness to confront the
regime, stating in their ruling that “if a new government gains authority and
dominance through force, it can be effectively challenged only by a stronger
force; no judicial dictum can prevail against it” (Del Carmen 1973: 1059–
1060). Similar dynamics are noted in Pakistan, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Uganda,
Nigeria, Cyprus, Seychelles, Grenada, and other countries (see, e.g., Mahmud
1994).
In such circumstances, formal judicial independence can clearly exist
within an authoritarian state. One can also understand why an authoritar-
ian ruler would find it politically advantageous to maintain formal judicial
independence. Del Carmen’s (1973: 1061) characterization of judicial politics
under Marcos is particularly illuminating:
While it is true that during the interim period . . . the President can use his
power to bludgeon the Court to subservience or virtual extermination, the
President will most probably not do that – ironically, because he realizes that
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it is in his interest to keep the Court in operation. On the balance sheet,
the Court thus far has done the President more service than disservice, more
good than harm.
The important dynamic to note in each of these instances is that authoritar-
ian regimes were able to gain judicial compliance and enjoy some measure
of legal legitimation without having to launch a direct assault on judicial
autonomy. The anticipated threat of executive reprisal and the simple futility
of court rulings on the most sensitive political issues are usually sufficient to
produce judicial compliance with the regime’s core interests. An odd irony
results: the more deference that a court pays to executive power, the more
institutional autonomy an authoritarian regime is likely to extend to it.8
The internal structure of appointments and promotions can also constrain
judicial activism quite independently of regime interference. The judiciary
in Pinochet’s Chile is a good example of a court system that failed to act as
a meaningful constraint on the executive, despite the fact that it was insti-
tutionally independent from the government. According to Hilbink (chapter
4), this failure had everything to do with the process of internal promotion
and recruitment, wherein Supreme Court justices controlled the review and
promotion of subordinates throughout the judiciary. The hermetically sealed
courts did not fall victim to executive bullying. Rather, the traditional political
elite controlling the upper echelons of the court system disciplined judges
who did not follow their commitment to a thin conception of the rule of law.9
The case of Singapore, discussed here by Gordon Silverstein in Chapter 3,
provides a further example. Silverstein documents how Singapore’s courts do
very well on formal measures of independence, yet despite having a good deal
of autonomy in economic and administrative matters they do not constrain the
government politically. With its commanding majority in the Parliament, Lee
Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party easily issued new legislation and even consti-
tutional amendments to sideline political opponents, all the while respecting
8 This observation should also call into question our common understanding of the concept
of “judicial independence.” If we understand judicial independence to mean institutional
autonomy from other branches of government, then we must conclude that more than a
few authoritarian states satisfy this formal requirement. In both democratic and authoritarian
contexts, formal institutional autonomy appears to be a necessary condition for the emergence
of judicial power, but in both cases it is insufficient by itself to produce effective checks on
power.
9 Hilbink finds that the independent Chilean Supreme Court ironically became a significant
obstacle to democratic consolidation, challenging the assumption in the vast majority of the
political science literature that independent courts provide a check on executive or legislative
abuses of power and that courts consistently work to protect basic rights that are essential for a
healthy democracy.
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formal judicial independence. All of these cases suggest that formalist con-
ceptions of the rule of law are not enough to ensure substantive notions of
political liberalism.
Alternatively, one can imagine courts that have a very broad scope of activity,
but have relatively little autonomy. Scope is a distinct issue from autonomy
(see Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002). Magaloni’s account in this volume (see
Chapter 7) of the Mexican judiciary under the PRI seems to illustrate the
model of a judiciary with a wide scope of formal authority but little autonomy.
Judicial appointments were highly centralized, and the judicial process was
used to suppress the opposition.
Fragmented versus Unified Judicial Systems
Authoritarian regimes also contain judicial activism by engineering frag-
mented judicial systems in place of unified judiciaries. In the ideal type of
a unified judiciary, the regular court hierarchy has jurisdiction over every
legal dispute in the land. In fragmented systems, on the other hand, one or
more exceptional courts run alongside the regular court system. In these aux-
iliary courts, the executive retains tight controls through nontenured political
appointments, heavily circumscribed due process rights, and retention of the
ability to order retrials if it wishes. Politically sensitive cases are channeled
into these auxiliary institutions when necessary, enabling rulers to sideline
political threats as needed. With such auxiliary courts waiting in the wings,
authoritarian rulers can extend substantial degrees of autonomy to the regular
judiciary.
Examples can be found in a number of diverse contexts. In Franco’s Spain,
Jose Toharia (1975: 495) noted that “Spanish judges at present seem fairly inde-
pendent of the Executive with respect to their selection, training, promotion,
assignment, and tenure.” Yet Toharia also observed that the fragmented struc-
ture of judicial institutions and parallel tribunals acted “to limit the sphere of
action of the ordinary judiciary.” This institutional configuration ultimately
enabled the regime to manage the judiciary and contain judicial activism, all
the while claiming respect and deference to independent rule-of-law institu-
tions. Toharia explains that “with such an elaborate, fragile balance of inde-
pendence and containment of ordinary tribunals, the political system had
much to gain in terms of external image and internal legitimacy. By preserv-
ing the independence of ordinary courts . . . it has been able to claim to have
an independent system of justice and, as such, to be subject to the rule of law.”
All other things being equal, there is likely to be a direct relationship bet-
ween the degree of independence and the degree of fragmentation of judicial
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institutions in authoritarian contexts. The more independence a court enjoys,
the greater the likely degree of judicial fragmentation in the judicial system
as a whole. Boundaries between the two sets of judicial institutions also shift
according to political context. Generally speaking, the more compliant the reg-
ular courts are, the more that authoritarian rulers allow political cases to remain
in their jurisdiction. The more the regular courts attempt to challenge regime
interests, on the other hand, the more the jurisdiction of the auxiliary courts is
expanded.
In authoritarian states, the regular judiciary is unwilling to rule on the con-
stitutionality of parallel state security courts for fear of losing a hopeless struggle
with the regime, illustrating both the core compliance function at work and
the awareness among judges that they risk the ability to champion rights at
the margins of political life if they attempt to challenge the regime’s core
legal mechanisms for maintaining political control. Returning to the Egyp-
tian example, the Supreme Constitutional Court had ample opportunities to
strike down provisions that denied citizens the right of appeal to regular judi-
cial institutions, but it almost certainly exercised restraint because impeding
the function of the exceptional courts would result in a futile confrontation
with the regime. Ironically, the regime’s ability to transfer select cases to
exceptional courts facilitated the emergence of judicial power in the regular
judiciary. The Supreme Constitutional Court was able to push a liberal agenda
and maintain its institutional autonomy from the executive largely because the
regime was confident that it ultimately retained full control over its political
opponents. To restate the broader argument, the jurisdiction of judicial insti-
tutions in authoritarian regimes is ironically dependent on the willingness of
judges (particularly those in the higher echelons of the courts) to manage and
contain the judiciary’s own activist impulses. Judicial activism in authoritarian
regimes is only made possible by its insulation within a fundamentally illiberal
system.
Constraining Access to Justice
Authoritarian rulers can also contain judicial activism by adopting a variety
of institutional configurations that constrain the efforts of litigants and judges.
At the most fundamental level, civil law systems provide judges with less
maneuverability and less capacity to create “judge-made” law than enjoyed
by their common law counterparts (Merryman 1985; Osiel 1995). The rapid
spread of the civil law model historically was not merely the result of colonial
diffusion, in which colonizers simply reproduced the legal institutions of the
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mother country. In many cases, the civil law model was purposefully adopted
independent of colonial imposition because it provided a better system through
which rulers could constrain, if not prevent, judge-made law. Although the
differences between civil law and common law systems are often overstated
and even less meaningful over time as more civil law countries adopt proce-
dures for judicial review of legislation, civil law judges may be relatively more
constrained than their common law counterparts as a formal matter.10 More
important than any legal constraints is the norm that judges in civil law systems
are to apply the law mechanically, resulting in a tendency toward thin rather
than thick conceptions of the rule of law.
Regimes can engineer further constraints on the institutional structure of
judicial review,11 the type of judicial review permitted,12 and the legal standing
requirements. For example, a regime can constrain judges more effectively
by imposing a centralized structure of judicial review in place of a decentral-
ized structure. Centralized review yields fewer judges who must be bargained
with, co-opted, or contained, resulting in predictable relationships with known
individuals. It was precisely for this reason that the Turkish military imposed
a centralized structure of judicial review in the 1982 Constitution.13 Another
technique, recounted here by Peter Solomon in Chapter 10, is to under-enforce
judicial decisions.
Most regimes also limit the types of legal challenges that can be made against
the state. In Magaloni’s account of Mexico under the PRI, citizens could
only raise amparo cases, radically constraining the Mexican Supreme Court.
Similarly, article 12 of the Chinese Administrative Litigation Law empowers
citizens to challenge decisions involving personal and property rights, but it
10 Shapiro explains that the role of the civil law judge as simply applying preexisting legal codes
is a myth because it assumes that codes can be made complete, consistent, and specific,
which is never fully actualized in reality. The result is that civil court judges engage in judicial
interpretation, a fundamentally political role, just as judges do in common law systems (Shapiro
1981).
11 In a centralized system of judicial review, only one judicial body (typically a specialized con-
stitutional court) is empowered to perform review of legislation. In a diffused system of judicial
review, on the other hand, any court can decide on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality
of a particular piece of legislation.
12 Courts with provisions for concrete review examine laws after they take effect, in concrete legal
disputes. Courts with provisions for abstract review examine legislation as part of the normal
legislative process and can nullify legislation before it takes effect.
13 In the 1961 Turkish Constitution, courts could practice judicial review if the Constitutional
Court had not issued a judgment within a defined period. This procedure was abolished in the
1982 Constitution, and a number of other constraints were put in place to narrow the scope
and standing requirements of judicial review (Belge 2006).
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does not mention political rights, such as the freedom of association, assembly,
speech, and publication. These select issue areas speak volumes about the
intent of the central government to rein in local bureaucrats while precluding
the possibility of overt political challenges through the courts.
Incapacitating Judicial Support Networks
Finally, authoritarian regimes can contain court activism by incapacitating
judicial support networks. In his comparative study, The Rights Revolution,
Epp (1998) shows that the most critical variable determining the timing,
strength, and impact of rights revolutions is neither the ideology of judges,
nor specific rights provisions, nor a broader culture of rights consciousness.
Rather, the critical ingredient is the ability of rights advocates to build orga-
nizational capacity that enables them to engage in deliberate, strategic, and
repeated litigation campaigns. Rights advocates can reap the benefits that come
from being “repeat players” when they are properly organized, coordinated,
and funded.14 Although Epp’s study is concerned with courts in democratic
polities, his framework sheds light on the structural weakness of courts in
authoritarian regimes.
The weakness of judicial institutions vis-a`-vis the executive is not only the
result of direct constraints that the executive imposes on the courts; it is also
related to the characteristic weakness of civil society in authoritarian states.
The task of forming an effective judicial support network from a collection
of disparate rights advocates is all the more difficult because activists not only
have to deal with the collective action problems that typically bedevil political
organizing in democratic systems but authoritarian regimes also actively mon-
itor, intimidate, and suppress organizations that dare to challenge the state.
Harassment can come in the form of extralegal coercion, but more often it
comes in the form of a web of illiberal legislation spun out from the regime.
With the legal ground beneath them constantly shifting, rights organizations
find it difficult to build organizational capacity before having to disband and
reorganize under another umbrella association. Given the interdependent
nature of judicial power and support network capacity in authoritarian poli-
ties, the framework of laws regulating and constraining the activities of judicial
support networks is likely to be one of the most important flashpoints of clashes
between courts and regimes.
14 The advantages enjoyed by “repeat players” in the legal system were first examined by Marc
Galanter in his classic 1974 article, “Why the ‘Haves’ Come out Ahead.”
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The story of courts in authoritarian regimes is likely to involve a dialectic
of empowerment – as regimes seek the benefits only judicial autonomy can
provide – and constraint, as regimes seek to minimize the associated costs of
judicial autonomy. The latter reaction is more likely as courts build up their
power, and as activist networks expand their links within and outside of society
so as to become a plausible alternative to the regime (Moustafa 2007). Yet, in
certain rare cases, the wheels of justice may simply have too much momentum
to stop.
conclusion
Judicial politics in authoritarian states is often far more complex than we com-
monly assume. The cases reviewed in this volume reveal that authoritarian
rulers often make use of judicial institutions to counteract the many dysfunc-
tions that plague their regimes. Courts help regimes maintain social control,
attract capital, maintain bureaucratic discipline, adopt unpopular policies,
and enhance regime legitimacy. However, courts also have the potential to
open a space for activists to mobilize against the state, and synergistic alliances
sometimes form with judges who also wish to expand their mandate and
affect political reform. Authoritarian rulers work to contain judicial activism
through providing incentives that favor judicial self-restraint, designing frag-
mented judicial systems, constraining access to justice, and incapacitating
judicial support networks. However, those efforts may not be completely effec-
tive. Instead, a lively arena of contention emerges in what we typically imagine
to be the least likely environment for the judicialization of politics – the author-
itarian state.
We conclude with an expression of modesty. We recognize that our findings
in this volume are only a first step, and there is far more work to do to expand
the geographic and institutional scope of inquiry into authoritarian regimes.
The contributors to this project hope, however, to have collectively identified
avenues of inquiry and particular dynamics that will inform future work in
this area. Unfortunately, it appears that work on authoritarian regimes will be
needed for many years to come.
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